
West Bank Annexation: the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

Palm Beach Synagogue

Mark Langfan
Zoom Talk Presentation
May 25, 2020






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בקעות	4
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גיתית	6
ורד יריחו	7
ייט"ב	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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רימונים	22
שדמות מחולה	23
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רותם	27
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ובים בשטח A	יש
עוג׳ה	
יריחו	
ובים בשטח B	יש
תל שמסיה	A
מרג׳ א- נעג׳ה	В
זבדיאת	C
ג'פטליק	D
דומה	E
פסאיל	F

Netanyahu Plan



Trump Plan



Netanyahu Plan

Trump Plan




Netanyahu Plan





Trump Plan























Figure 2. Allon Plan Topographic Breakdown:

- a). Israel: Tel Aviv Coastal Plain
- b). Gradual downward slope of the Western two thirds of West Bank
- Heavy Palestinian population
- c). Extremely steep slope of the Eastern one third of West Bank -Sparse Palestinian population except for Jericho
- d). Jordan

Allon Plan would keep area c), the part <u>furthest</u> from a) the Tel Aviv coastal plain. This area c) would be isolated and separated from the main Israeli population centers by Palestinian State in area b). It would also be surrounded by the Palestinian State b) and Jordan d).

Deal of the Century Spheres of Control

Federal

Overarching "security" FBI versus State government Airspace
Electromagnetic Spectrum
Immigration Control
"Demilitarization" of State by Federales

i.e. Feds can seize state state anti-aircraft weapons that threaten US air force

Trans-state water resources

State

State highway police and state militias Education Welfare

City

Local police
Garbage pickup
Building code and approval




Figure 3. Water issues - Roof/Gutter analogy
Applicable to the Golan Heights and Judea & Samaria

- A. Rain falls on mountains (roof).
- B. Rainwater flows down mountain range into fertile valley (as off roof without a gutter).
- C. Rainwater can be held back by Arab dams functioning as a gutter, preventing the water from irrigating the Israeli agricultural areas.




Figure 4. Saline/Fresh Water Balance/ Imbalance Applicable to Judea & Samaria (Westbank) and Israeli coastal aquifers

- A. Salt water pushes in.
- B. Fresh water pushes out.

 Consequently, there currently exists a balance of saline/fresh water in the Israeli coastal aquifer.

 (In a demonstration the plexi pieces can be moved back and forth to convey sense of balancing and equilibrium.)
- C. If the Palestinians use the fresh water that falls in the West Bank that now flows freely into the Israeli coastal aquifers, the balance will be destroyed and salt water will push in and destroy the Israeli coastal aquifer.




Figure 5. Airspace considerations:

- A. "Theoretical" Airspace Border.
- B. Mid-point extending Palestinian Air Defense Umbrella.
- C. "De facto" Palestinian Air Defense Umbrella, which will extend over and neutralize Lod and Ramat David as well as almost all of Israel's strategic air bases. Such a de facto Palestinian Air Umbrella will paralyze Israel's entire defensive capability.





Figure 6. "Air space" and "air space control" by control of land and air.

- A. 3 pie pieces facing east in Judea & Samaria equal:
 - a) Israeli Radar
 - b) Israeli Jets
 - c) Israeli Air Defense Weapons.
- B. All of which will blunt air attack d*) from east.
- C. and D. Without a), b) and c), but with 3 pie pieces facing west and large pie slice pointed west like a knife, which represent:
 - a*) Palestinian "Civilian" Radar.
 - b*) Palestinian "Demilitarized" Helicopters.
 - c*) Palestinian "light" Air Defense Weapons.
 - "Light" = "Heavy" by Helicopter bay.
 - d*) Palestinian Attack Aircraft Knife dagger.



"Demilitarized" Palestinian State =



Katyushas carry chemical weapons too!





JCS 1887/721-1

26 June 1967

Pages 2 - 9, incl.

DISTRIBUTION B

REPORT BY THE J-5

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

MIDDLE EAST BOUNDARIES (U)
Reference: JCS 1887/721

DECISION


- 1. At their meeting on 28 June 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after making amendments, approved the recommendations contained in paragraph 8 of this report.
- 2. This Decision replaces page 2. Holders are requested to substitute the additional attached revised pages 6 and 7-8. Incorporating the amendments, and to destroy the superseded pages in accordance with security regulations.
- 3. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its Appendix and Annex, was forwarded as JCSM-373-67, dated 29 June 1967, to the Secretary of Defense. Copies of this paper are being forwarded to CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, and CINCCTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA.
- 4. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

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
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REPORT BY THE J-5 to the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF on MIDDLE EAST BOUNDARIES (U)

Reference: JCS 1887/721

26 June 1967



LEGEND



MINIMUM TERRITORY NEEDED BY ISRAEL FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES



JCS 1887/721-1

26 June 1967

Pages 2 - 9, incl.

DISTRIBUTION B

REPORT BY THE J-5

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

MIDDLE EAST BOUNDARIES (U)
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CONCLUSIONS

CONCLUSIONS	
6. Based solely on military considerations, Israel would	Ŗ
require the following minimum territory to permit a more effec-	9
tive defense against possible conventional Arab attack and	10
terrorist raids:	11
a. The high ground which runs north-south through the	12
center of West Jordan to include the Latrun area and, pos-	13
sibly, Jerusalem and that portion of West Jordan south of	14
Jerusalem and west of the Dead Sea.	15
b. The Syrian heights which overlook Lake Tiberian and	16
the Israeli-Syrian border to where it intersects with	17
Lebanon.	15
c. The Gaza Strip.	19
d. That portion of the Sinai Peninsula south and east of	20
the Wadi el Gerafi, then east to an intersection with the	21
Gulf of Aqaba at approximately 29020' north latitude and	22
the demilitarized zone around Al Awja.	23
e. Key terrain in the Sinai controlling the Strait of	24
Tiran, provided international guarantees for free passage	25
of the Gulf of Aqaba are not forthcoming.	. 26
7. A decision on the proper defensible toundaries for a	27
country which is based solely on military considerations would	28
ignore the inescapable political, economic, sociological, and	29
psychological considerations which help determine any state's	30
defensive posture.	31

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RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended	that	
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- Appendix and Annex, which reflects the above conclusions, be forwarded to the Secretary of Defence.
- b. Copies of this paper be forwarded to CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFDA.
- c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.
- d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, UE Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

Action Officers:

Lt Col M. E. Key, USA Capt P. L. Murphy, USA Col J. E. Murphy, USAF Near East Branch, J-5 Extensions 59831/70255

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THIS TOWN TO SCHOOL STATE

APPENDIX

DISCUSSION OF KEY ISRAELI BORDER AREAS

1. (S) The Jordanian West Bank	i
a. Threat. The Jordan-Israeli border is 330 miles in	•:
length extending from the Gulf of Agaba northward to the Deud	1
Sea, thence following the armistice demarcation lines and the	4
Jordan River northward to the Yarmuk River, thence along the	٠,
Yarmuk River to the Syrian frontier. This border area has	6
traditionally been lightly held by military forces and defenses	7
consisted mainly of small, widely separated outposts and patrols	Ħ
and, therefore, afforded an area where launching of saboteur.	r,
and terrorists into Israel was relatively easy. During the	10
period January 1965 to February 1967, a total of 53 incidents	11
of sabotage and mining activity took place along this border.	12
These activities resulted in three killed, 35 wounded, and	1 •
damage to houses, roads, bridges, railroads, and water and	1 4
electric power installations in Israel. Instances of exchange	15
of small arms fire occurred quite frequently. The majority of	16
these events took place from the Mount Hebron and Aravah areas	17
where the Jordanian authorities did not take sufficient meas-	16
ures to protect against line crosses and saboteurs. The high	19
ground running north-south through the middle of West Jordan	20
overlooks Israel's narrow midsection and offers a route for a	21
thrust to the sea which would split the country in two parts.	22
b. Requirement. A boundary along the commanding terrain	23
overlooking the Jordan River from the west could provide a.	24
shorter defense line. However, as a minimum, Israel would	25
need a defense line generally along the axis Bardala-Tubas-	26
Nablus-Bira-Jerusalem and then to the northern part of the	27

STATES CONTINUENTAL

1

Dead Sea. This line would widen the narrow portion of Israel 28

Appendix

(Revised - 27 June 1967)

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- CONTINCUTAL

and provide additional terrain for the acfense of Tel Aviv. It would provide additional buffer for the air base at Beersheba. In addition, this line would give a portion of the foothills to Israel and avoid interdiction by artillery in the Israeli villages in the lowlands. This line would also provide a shorter defense line than the border of 4 June 1967 and would reduce the Jordanian salient into Israel. It also provides adequate lines of communications for lateral movement.

2. (S) Syrian Territory Contiguous to Israel

a. Threat. The border between Syria and Israel extends 10 approximately 43 miles. It extends from a point on the 11 Lebanese-Syrian border east to the vicinity of Baniyas, south 1.2 to Lake Tiberias, then south along the eastern shore of the 13 lake to the Syrian-Jordanian border. During the period January 14 1965 to February 1967, a total of 28 sabotage and terrorist 15 acts occurred along this border. In addition, there were numerous shellings of villages from the high ground overlooking 17 the area southeast of Lake Tiberias. Casualties were seven 1 8 killed and 18 wounded. Control of the dominant terrain affords 19 Syria a military route of approach into northern Israel; how-20 ever, the greatest threat in this sector is from terrorism and 21 sabotage. 22

b. Requirement. Israel must hold the commanding terrain east 23 of the boundary of 4 June 1967 which overlooks the Galilee area. 24 To provide a defense in-depth, Israel would need a strip about 25 15 miles wide extending from the border of Lebanon to the border 26 of Jordan. This line would provide protection for the Israeli 27 villages on the east bank of Lake Tiberias but would make 28 defending forces east of the lake vulnerable to a severing 29 thrust from Jordan to the southern tip of the lake. The 30 Israelis would probably decide to accept this risk. As a side 31 effect, this line would give the Israelis control of approxi-32 mately 25 miles of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline. 33

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Appendix

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
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
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
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יריחו	
ובים בשטח B	יש
תל שמסיה	A
מרג׳ א- נעג׳ה	В
זבדיאת	C
ג'פטליק	D
דומה	E
פסאיל	F

"Demilitarized" Palestinian State =



Katyushas carry chemical weapons too!





122mm-Katyusha State-Deniable-Weapon



JANES: Other types of of warhead can be installed . . . including chemical (VX or GB nerve agent see under Equivalent projectiles)



M302-Khaibar Rocket State-Undeniable-Weapon

Warhead 150kg 330lbs Fuel-Air Capable **Range** 100-160km 66-100mi

> **Weight** 750kg 1,653lbs

Diameter 302mm 1ft

<u>Height</u> 6.3m 20ft





Ball-bearings loaded into Palestinian Katyusha warheads



Israeli school crossing hit by ball-bearing Katyusha rocket warheads



Israeli Road guard rails hit by ball-bearing katyusha rocket warheads



Israeli Jewish boy crippled and maimed by Palestinian ball-bearing Katyusha rocket warheads.

Jane's Intelligence and Insight You Can Trust

ML GB = Sarin, High Volatility Note: VX = Low Volatility

122 mm BM-21 Grad-series rockets (Russian Federation), Artillery rockets

On the base model 122 mm 9M22, the warhead is the M-21-0F. containing 6.4kg of TGAF explosive detonated by a 9A210 or an MPB Point-Detonating (PD) fuze, which is inertially armed only after travelling some 150 to 400 m from the launch point. Other types of warhead can be installed in place of the HE frag, including chemical (VX or GB nerve agent see under Equivalent projectiles).

High Volatility = Evaporates quickly Low Volatility = Persistent, area-denial use

Katyushas are chemical-warhead capable